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THE UPBRINGING OF A CREATURE: THE SCOPE OF A PARENT’S
RIGHT TO TEACH CHILDREN TO HATE
By
Brooke A. Emery*
child racist speech. By focusing on the child as the hearer of
hate speech, First Amendment roadblocks that typical hate
speech regulations run into may be bypassed. After showing that
First Amendment principles such as “marketplace” theory and
autonomy theory are unpersuasive when applied to a child, this
article will show that the captive audience doctrine allows the
State to regulate a parent’s decision to raise her child as a racist.
Parent-to-child racist speech also implicates the constitutional
right
of a parent to raise her child as she sees fit. AlINTRODUCTION: THE BIRTH OF A CREATURE
though a parent has the right to control the upbringing of her
This paper examines racist2 speech that is passed down child, she does not have a right to raise her child as a racist. The
from parent to child and asks whether the State can constitution- Supreme Court has long recognized a parent’s fundamental right
ally impose regulations3 on such speech.4 The regulation of par- to control the upbringing of her child as a liberty interest protected under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendent-to-child racist speech implicates
ment. The Fourteenth Amendment, in
two distinct constitutional rights:
turn, requires that courts show deference
one’s right to free speech and a parto a parent’s decisions.22 Underlying this
ent’s right to control the upbringing
right is the presumption that most parents
of her child.
The United States Consti- parent-to-child racist speech can be act in the best interest of their children. In
reality, however, a parent’s decision is not
tution contemplates that its citizens
23
be free to “think as [they] will and regulated without violating either a always in the best interest of her child.
5
speak as [they] think.” The First parent’s right to free speech or a par- To accommodate this reality, a parent’s
fundamental right is limited by the rights
Amendment protects this freedom
ent’s right to control the upbringing of the child and the State’s interests in
by prohibiting laws that limit or
protecting children from harm and promotof her child.
punish speech.6 Perhaps because of
ing societal well-being.24
its prominence as the first of all
7
When a child’s “physical or menenumerated rights or because of its
tal health is jeopardized,” the State has the
simple but magnanimous message,8
power to abrogate the parent’s rights if it
the First Amendment has captured
is in the best interest of the child.25 Teachthe hearts and minds of its citizens:9 it is romanticized by the
10
to a child jeopardizes a child’s mental and physical
avant-garde as a protector of art and intellectual freedom, it ing racism
26
reverberates throughout suburban lunchrooms as irreverent re- health. Once the harm to a child is established, the State can
buttals to schoolhouse teasing,11 and it is proclaimed a tool for potentially limit a parent’s fundamental right. In sum, parent-topolitical and social change by the downtrodden and oppressed.12 child racist speech can be regulated without violating either a
There is no doubt that its tenets, secured by our country’s foun- parent’s right to free speech or a parent’s right to control the
ders, have allowed American culture to breathe unorthodox air,13 upbringing of her child.
Part I begins with a discussion of the legal proceedings
a communicative freedom that is often stifled by less expansive
speech protections in other countries.14 Lurking in the shadows, through which the State has the opportunity to regulate parenthowever, is speech’s power to harm.15 Speech, capable of much to-child racist speech. It then discusses how the transmission of
more than mere offense, can cause psychological16 and physi- racist speech from parent to child harms the child. Part II addresses the substantive due process analysis. This Part discusses
cal17 harm to its intended targets, as well as message recipients.18
There has been much debate over the legitimacy and the scope of the parental rearing right, and it shows that the
propriety of regulating racist speech.19 This debate has typically State’s interest in protecting the welfare of the child and promotfocused on racist speech made in a public setting that causes ing societal well-being may allow the State to interfere when a
harm to the target of the hate speech. Efforts to regulate such racist upbringing exists. Part III begins with an examination of a
speech have largely failed20 because of the doctrinal prohibition child’s speech rights. It moves into an explanation of the underlying justifications for free speech and argues that they are inapon regulating speech based on the ideology of its message.21
This article argues that the unique nature of parent-to- posite to parent-to-child racist speech. Finally, it introduces the
child racist speech allows it to be regulated under the present captive audience exception and shows that parent-to-child racist
First Amendment framework, notwithstanding the failed at- speech is not protected because a child is essentially “captive” to
tempts to regulate other racist speech. The article further argues her parent’s racist speech. Part IV concludes with a discussion
that such speech should be regulated because the core principles of the obstacles and implications of regulating parent-to-child
that underlie speech protection are not applicable to parent-to- racist speech.
There is no absurdity so obvious that it cannot be firmly
planted in the human head if
you only begin to impose it
before the age of five, by
constantly repeating it with
an air of great solemnity.1

60

THE MODERN AMERICAN

CHILDREN AND RACISM IN THE REAL WORLD
At a county fair, a young girl sings sweetly in front of a
small crowd:
Well sit down and listen, to what I have to say.
Soon will come a great war, a bloody but holy
day. And after that purging our people will be
free, and sing up in the bright skies, a sun for
all to see.
Times are very tough now for a proud White
man to live. And although it may appear that
this world has no life to give. Times are soon
changing, this can[’]t go on [f]or long. And
on that joyful summer’s day, we’ll sing our
Victory song.27
In another part of the country, a young boy comes
home after school and becomes a virtual Klansman, killing
Blacks, Latinos, and Jews in an “ethnic cleansing” video game.
28
Somewhere else, a child creates a kid’s page for his father’s
hate group’s web site.29 A six-year-old African-American boy
riding on a school bus sees a group of white men and women
through the window and proclaims, “I hate white people.”30
Somewhere else, a group of middle-school children paints swastikas on cars in a predominantly Jewish neighborhood.31 A
group of high-school students is on trial for brutally beating a
young girl because of her race.32
The aforementioned acts, based on real events, invoke a
response of sadness for the child, rather than revulsion. This
response to children exhibiting racist tendencies stems from a
sense that the racist child has been robbed of the innocence of
childhood, and that the adult that she becomes will have been
robbed of opportunities as she matures down a path already
paved for her. Although there are many factors that cause a
child to hate another based on race, 33 this article addresses only
parental influence.34 This article sets out to determine whether
the State may prevent harm to a child and to society from parents who pass racist hatred down to their children. This section
begins with a description of the legal arenas in which the State
may wield its power to restrict racist parental indoctrination.
SOCIAL CONTEXT: INHERITING RACISM
Parents pass down many things to their children: genes, personality traits,35 values, oral histories.36 Some parents pass down
racism to their children through racist speech.37
For the purposes of this article, racist speech is hate
speech that targets groups or individuals based on race. There
are several defining characteristics of hate speech.38 First, hate
speech sends a message of hatred or contempt. Second, hate
speech usually conveys a message of inferiority. Third, its message targets a specific group or an individual because she is a
member of that group. Racist speech includes racial threats,
slurs, epithets, symbols, depictions, and “sanitized racist comments.”39
The effect on a child of growing up in a racist home has
not generated much scholarly work and a need exists for a larger
body of social science and legal research on this topic. HowSpecial - Fall 2008

ever, some observations can be gleaned from the field of developmental psychology and research on racism in general. Available research indicates that “[a]ttitudes of prejudice begin to
form between the ages of 3 and 4 years, with immediate family
members having the most profound effect on the development of
attitude and values.”40 Moreover, younger children have a decreased cognitive ability to discern reasonable from unreasonable information, making them more susceptible to racist
speech.41 Thus, racism should have a more profound effect on
children, especially younger ones, than on adults. It is with an
eye sensitive toward this impressionability of young children to
racist speech that we turn to discuss racism’s effect on the racist
speaker.
Hate is a defining characteristic of racist speech. Hate
is a “complex, affective state alloyed with aggression. It is
aroused by the experience of frustration and, in its most stark
and uncompromising manner, by events that are felt to threaten
life.”42 Within the psychiatric community, there has been debate
over whether extreme racism is a serious mental illness. Some
psychiatrists propose its inclusion in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.43
Those who argue that racism is a mental illness explain
that “[extremely racist] patients experience problems of impulse
disturbance. This disinhibition may activate inculcated, socially
learned, biased beliefs; adverse cognitive appraisals and stereotypes; hostile behaviors toward out-group persons; or some combination of these things.”44 Children, who have lower impulse
control relative to adults, are therefore more prone to act upon
racist beliefs. Researchers have also discovered psychological
and physiological problems associated with clinical racism: “[f]
requent clinical problems include lability, hypo-mania, and
marked anxiety. Additionally, these patients evidence relational
deficits. Psychotherapy patients who expressed biased attitudes
toward members of cultural out-groups . . . also had higher ratings for . . . paranoid, borderline, and antisocial personality disorders, when compared with other psychotherapy patients.”45
While there is no conclusive evidence that learning
racism causes psychological or physiological harm to the racist,
the law does not always require conclusive evidence in order to
protect children from likely harm.46 Moreover, racial bias has a
severe impact on the social competence of the racist:
For patients who evidence severe forms of bias, intergroup contact is predictably aversive. For these patients, out-group persons are often seen as threatening.
For some clinically biased patients, the solution is
avoidance. Other patients experience marked anxiety,
and yet others express overt hostility. . . Pathologically
biased patients may engage in overtly hostile behaviors
in benign intergroup situations.47
An inability to engage in culturally diverse interactions
is also a practical disability. It prohibits the child and future
adult from fully participating in society, inhibiting even the most
basic activities, such as going to the grocery store, workplace, or
voting booths.
Parents who instill racist beliefs in their children contribute to their children’s feelings of threat, anxiety, and fear.
For example, most members of the American white racist movement believe that “they, as White men, are members of an endangered species.”48 Racist parents strip their child of any sense
of personal security.49 The fear instilled by racist parents goes
61

beyond teaching a child to be cautious about talking to strangers
or crossing the street. Whereas there is a rational basis to fear
crossing the street, the fear of people of another race is irrational.50 Further, racism not only instills fear, but also creates
contempt and hatred. It is the combination of both fear and hatred that harms the child.
Some members of the psychiatric community have argued that teaching racism to a child is a form of psychological
abuse, which constitutes child abuse in some States.51 Psychological abuse is “sustained inappropriate behaviour which damages, or substantially reduces, the creative and developmental
potential of crucially important mental faculties and mental
processes of a child . . . [including] intelligence, memory, recognition, perception, attention, language and moral development.”52
One reason offered to show that racist indoctrination is
psychological abuse is that it adversely affects a child’s moral
development. For example, “children taught to hate are prevented from incorporating the desirable virtues of tolerance,
reverence for life, respect for individual differences and mutual
understanding,” causing these children to “suffer an arrest in
their moral development.”53 Recent neurobiology studies have
also linked early childhood psychological abuse to abnormalities
in brain development.54 Thus, parent-child hate indoctrination
may have an irreversible effect on a child’s developing brain.
A related concern is that children who are taught to
hate will later commit hate crimes. While no definitive link has
been shown between racist indoctrination during childhood and
hate crimes, it is estimated that 70% of all hate crimes are committed by juveniles.55 One possible reason for this statistic is
that young people are more likely to act on racist beliefs than
adults.56
The power of the State to interfere with a parent’s decision to raise her child as a racist person rests on the availability
of legal forums in which the State can exercise its power, the
type and degree of the parent’s racist behavior, and the extent of
harm the behavior has on the child. The next section discusses
the jurisprudence that has developed around the State’s ability to
interfere with the family.
LEGAL CONTEXT
The State plays several substantial roles in protecting
and supporting children.57 Under the child protection umbrella,
the State provides services ranging from family counseling to
parenting education,58 and it governs the removal and termination of parental rights.59 Under the family dissolution umbrella,
the State may determine custody of a child, limit visitation
rights, and order a parent to behave in a specific way to retain
custody of a child. Through public assistance, the State aids a
parent in supporting her child. In addition, the State influences a
child’s upbringing by providing public education and mandating
medical care.60 Each of the aforementioned roles potentially
provides the State with the opportunity to interfere with a parent’s decision to teach racism to her child.61 However, as State
intervention is often tied to family failure or dysfunction,62 parents of intact families may be granted more freedom to teach
racism to their children, and children of intact families may not
be appropriately protected from racist indoctrination.
Today, some courts consider a parent’s use of racist
speech as a factor in determining custody and visitation rights.63
In In re Bianca W.F.,64 the Superior Court of Connecticut found
62

that “the father’s use of racial slurs or derogatory racial references” in front of the children constituted a “continuing form of
neglect of the children’s educational and moral needs.”65 Courts
have also ordered parents not to use specific racist language in
front of their children.66 While this practice has largely escaped
the notice of all but a few First Amendment scholars,67 this article argues that prohibiting or restricting a parent from teaching
her child to hate is constitutionally permissible. The contrary
view is that the consideration of speech in such proceedings is
impermissible because it violates free speech and substantive
due process.68 The debate survives partly because of the little
attention paid to family law proceedings.69
Today, amidst war, increasing intolerance of immigration, and rising hate crime statistics, racist indoctrination of children by parents must be examined. The State can and should
use its power to protect children from such indoctrination.

II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS:
BALANCING RIGHTS
Three interests are implicated when the State interferes
with a parenting decision: (1) the parents’, (2) the State’s, and
(3) the child’s.70 A court will weigh these interests to determine
whether a State statute or action infringes on a parent’s constitutional right.
The ability of the State to interfere with a parent’s right
to teach her child racism depends, first, on the relative importance assigned to the parent’s right to control the upbringing of
her child. The United States Supreme Court has found that a
parent’s right to raise her child is a fundamental right.71 This
fundamental right of the parent to raise her child as she sees fit
rests on a presumption that parents act in the best interests of
their children.72 The parental right in part derives from the
child’s interest in being taken care of properly; however, real
world experience calls into question the validity of the presumption that parents always act in their children’s best interest.
The Court has also recognized that the State has the
authority to intervene when a child’s welfare is at stake. The
State has greater power over children than it has over adults because “[a] democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity
as citizens, with all that implies.”73 The State may interfere with
the parent-child relationship where necessary to protect the welfare of the child or to educate future citizens.74
The State’s ability to impose itself into the parent-child
relationship derives not only from its own interest in protecting
its citizens, but also from the unique constitutional status of the
child. A child has constitutional rights, but not to the extent that
adults do.75 The limitations on a child’s rights are explained by
the unique characteristics of childhood. For example, the child’s
underdeveloped cognitive processes limit a child’s ability to
make appropriate decisions about her life. Young children “are
not able to think abstractly, have a limited future time sense, and
are limited in their ability to generalize and predict from experience.”76 For this reason, the law restricts a minor’s choice to
marry,77 engage in sexual activity with adults,78 consume alcohol, and vote in elections.
It is often unclear how a parent’s right to control the
upbringing of her child ought to be balanced against the State’s
interest in protecting the well-being of the child and the child’s
individual rights. The Supreme Court has failed to define the
THE MODERN AMERICAN

scope of the parental right to control the upbringing of chil- underlying purpose of the parental right is “to recognize and
dren.79 States have largely filled in this gap on a case-by-case prepare him for additional obligations.”99 According to the
basis.80 Legal scholars and social scientists have also weighed Court, “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State.”100 The
in. One view is that a parent should not have a fundamental right State thus has a limited role in raising a child.
to control the upbringing of her child at all.81 A more common
Meyer and Pierce both suggest that the parent’s interest
view—that a parent should have some rights—stops short of in controlling the upbringing of her child can outweigh the
relegating the child to parental property.82 Under this view, a State’s interest. Later cases reinforced the fundamental right of
parent should make decisions about her child with limited State a parent to control the upbringing of her child.101 In 2000, in
interference for several reasons: (1) a child cannot support her- Troxel v. Granville, the Court struck down a Washington statute
self or make important decisions; (2) optimal child rearing in- that allowed a judge to override a parent’s decision not to allow
cludes intimate and continuous relationships; (3) parents are in third-party visitation with her child.102 The plurality reaffirmed
the best position to know what is best for the child, and they care the presumption that fit parents act in their children’s best intermore about their child than anyone else; and (4) parents have est.103 The Court recognized the parental interest in the care,
traditionally held these rights.83 Additionally, some commenta- custody, and control of their children as “perhaps the oldest of
the fundamental liberty interests recogtors justify parental rights by noting
nized by the Court.”104 The broad nature
that parents have a personal interest
in molding their children in accorof the statute105 and the failure to accord
84
the limit on a parent’s fundamental deference to the parent’s choice made
dance with their desires and ideals.
The issue of parent-child racist right and the State’s powerful interest this statute unconstitutional.106
speech falls into the gray area of
long as a parent adequately cares for
in protecting the well-being of its So
parent-child-state jurisprudence.
his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will
children leaves room for the State to normally be no reason for the State to
inject itself into the private realm of the
SCOPE OF PARENTS’ FUNDAMENintervene when a parent’s racist
family to further question the ability of
TAL RIGHT
speech harms the child’s mental
the parent to make the best decisions
Two of the earliest cases to
concerning the rearing of that parent’s
health, public safety,
recognize the right to parent were
children.107
or
peace
and
order.
85
Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters.86 Both cases inLIMITS ON PARENTS’ RIGHT
volved parents’ right to educate
The parental right is not without limits. The State’s
their children as they see fit. Meyer addressed a Nebraska statute that prohibited the teaching of foreign languages, with the power to limit a parent’s child rearing discretion is at its highest
exception of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, to school children below when the child’s physical or mental health is jeopardized.108
the eighth grade.87 The purpose of the statute was to “promote The State, however, has the power to interfere even if the parcivic development” by ensuring that children “learn English and ent’s decision does not severely jeopardize the child’s health.
acquire American ideals” before they are educated in foreign An early case to recognize the limits on parental rights was
languages and ideals.88 The plaintiff, a parochial school teacher, Prince v. Massachusetts.109 In Prince, the Court held that the
was convicted under the statute for teaching a ten-year-old stu- State’s power to ensure that “children be both safeguarded from
dent to read German.89 The Court struck down the statute as abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and indeunconstitutional for unreasonably interfering with three inter- pendent well-developed men and citizens” outweighed the parests: the “calling of modern language teachers,” the ent’s interest.110 The statute in Prince imposed criminal sanc“opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge,” and the “power tions on guardians who permitted their minor children to sell
of parents to control the education” of their children.90 The newspapers or other literature on the street.111 The plaintiff, a
Court was also concerned that the statute would disadvantage Jehovah’s Witness, was charged with violating the statute when
the foreign-born segment of the population91 absent proof that she and her niece were distributing religious pamphlets for a
learning foreign languages harmed the health or well-being of a suggested donation of five cents.112 The Court concluded that
child.92 In Meyer, the Court noted that teaching a child German while the “custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in
was not in fact harmful and that there was some evidence that it the parents,” the State can override the parent’s right in order to
guard the child’s well-being,113 which may include “matters of
was actually helpful to a child.93
Pierce v. Society of Sisters also recognized a parent’s conscience and religious conviction.”114 State power over matright to control the upbringing of her child.94 In Pierce, the ters of conscience strengthens its ability to regulate parent-child
Court struck down an Oregon statute that required all parents hate indoctrination, which is largely a matter of conscience.
Thus, the limit on a parent’s fundamental right and the
and guardians of children between the ages of eight and sixteen
to send their children to public school.95 Two private schools State’s powerful interest in protecting the well-being of its chilchallenged the statute on the basis that compulsory public school dren leaves room for the State to intervene when a parent’s racist
attendance threatened business.96 The Court rested its decision speech harms the child’s mental health, public safety, or peace
on the statute’s impermissible interference with the plaintiff’s and order. Even so, before the State may intervene it must overproperty rights.97 In reaching its decision, however, the Court come a separate constitutional concern: the parent’s and the
found the statute was not a proper exercise of State power be- child’s right to free speech. This constitutional concern is the
cause it unreasonably and arbitrarily interfered “with the liberty focus of the following section.
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education
of children under their control.”98 The Court reasoned that the
Special - Fall 2008
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argument is applicable to hate speech. There is a presumption in
much of the scholarship that the State and parents agree that
Under the First Amendment, regulating parent-to-child children should not be subject to obscenity and violence, or that
racist speech implicates both the parent’s right to speech and the the State can regulate only in situations where the parent invites
such intervention.
child’s right to access speech.
Kevin Saunders discusses the effect on a child of learning hate speech,125 arguing that “a racist child is of questionable
psychological health, and the existence of hate-based crime
CHILDREN AND FIRST AMENDMENT COMMENTARY
demonstrates the danger of racism to community safety, so attempts to teach racism to children harm both the psychological
The cognitive, moral, and emotional immaturity of
126
Saunchildren can render them especially vulnerable to some forms of health of children and the physical safety of society.”
ders focuses on the constitutionality of prohibiting third parties
expression that they are ill equipped to protect themselves from.
from teaching racism to a child. In developing his thesis, howThey depend on others to advance their crucial interests and
ever, he states without analysis that the State would have no
protect them from harm.115
right to interfere if the parent wanted the child to receive hate
127
This article rejects that argument
Over the course of a lifetime, welfare interests wane material from a third party.
and liberty interests wax. When a person is born, she cannot because it fails to consider the State’s two distinct interests in
care for herself and therefore has the greatest interest in being protecting a child: a parens patriae interest and an interest in
cared for. As she matures, she becomes better able to take care aiding the parent. Saunders thus overlooks the ability of the
of herself, so her welfare interest decreases. Liberty interests, or State, as parens patriae, to protect the child from receiving racinterests in being free, increase as a child grows into an autono- ist information even when the parent wants the child to receive
mous being. Paternalism is thus less offensive to a child than to the information.
The Supreme Court recognized the two interests of the
an adult.116
The scope of the child’s right to free speech depends on State in Ginsberg v. New York, in which the Court upheld the
a balancing of welfare or developmental interests and liberty conviction of a luncheonette owner for selling sexually explicit
128
The
interests.117 Developmental interests are comprised of two types magazines to a minor, in violation of New York law.
Court
identified
two
legitimate
interests
that
granted
the
State
of interests: those interests that affect the present well-being of
the child and those interests that are held in trust.118 Describing the power to restrict children’s access to speech. The first interthe present developmental interests of a child, one commentator est is the State’s “independent interest” in fulfilling its parens
patriae function—in protecting the well-being of its youth and
suggests:
in seeing “that they are safeguarded from abuses which might
[B]ecause we must show concern for the quality of the prevent their growth into free and independent well-developed
129
The second interest is the State’s function
experience of childhood, we have reason to insulate men and citizens.”
130
The first interest is
children from unsettling materials even if exposure in aiding parents in their role of parent.
most
salient
in
determining
the
State’s
power
to interfere with
does not result in significant harm . . . We do not augment the quality of children’s lives by exposing them to parental discretion.
Restricting a parent’s ability to transmit racism to their
materials that they cannot grasp, but which nonetheless
children serves the State’s parens
elicit strong unsettling responses
patriae interest when the child’s
from them.119
Indoctrinating a child with racist well-being is harmed and her abilto grow into an independent,
The developmental interests of a child are
hate or fear of race extinction si- ity
well-developed citizen is hindered
harmed by racist indoctrination.120 If a
child manifests the psychological and lences future speech, thus degrading by the parent’s racist ideas. For
physical effects of clinical racism,121 her the interest that the First Amendment example, the parens patriae interest is served by protecting a young
quality of life during childhood is low.
was meant to protect.
child from being taught songs that
Future-oriented interests are
call for a racial holy war and prothose that “equip children with the habits
and capacities for reflective deliberation and self-direction that claim the inferiority of other races. The developmental effects
will permit them to live successful and responsible adult of racism on a child, which support this assertion, are discussed
lives.”122 If an activity harms a child’s ability to develop a sense in Part I.
Modern cases that restrict a child’s access to harmful
of justice or hinders growth of deliberative faculties, then the
child’s developmental interests are harmed.123 It is in this sense information must deal with the effect that any restriction may
131
FCC v. Pacifica Founthat it can be said that hate speech indoctrination has a have on adult access to information.
“silencing effect” on the child. “If children are to become the dation recognized that children can be protected from offensive
sort of beings for whom full rights of free expression are valu- speech by restricting broadcasting of offensive speech to hours
132
able, then the moral capacities on which the value of these rights when children will not likely be listening. Unlike restricting a
124
depends must be suitably nurtured and developed.”
Indoctri- radio broadcast to certain hours, which may potentially affect a
nating a child with racist hate or fear of race extinction silences large number of willing adult radio listeners, restricting a parent
future speech, thus degrading the interest that the First Amend- from teaching racism to her children will have only a nominal
ment was meant to protect. While most of the scholarship dis- effect on third-party adults. Any restrictions would affect only a
cussing First Amendment rights during childhood primarily ad- parent’s speech to her own child. It is likely that no one but the
dresses children’s access to obscenity and violence, much of the parent and child will be affected by the restriction.

III.FREEDOM OF SPEECH
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NO MARKET PLACE FOR CHILDREN
An abundance of scholarship has been dedicated to
explaining why speech must be protected from government
regulation. The first justification is that free speech unearths the
truth.133 Justice Holmes argued that free speech is essential to
finding truth and that only through a clash of ideas can truth be
attained.134 According to Holmes, “the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market.”135 John Stuart Mill, British philosopher and political economist, provided a similar justification for protecting
speech:
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as
well as the existing generation; those who dissent from
the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the
opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of
exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is
almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision
with error.136
Suppressing speech would have the unintended ramification of driving speech underground and
effectively allowing bad ideas to “smolder,” rather than
being ousted through opposition.137 Consistent with the
marketplace of ideas is the argument that offensive
speech should be combated with more speech rather
than with censorship.138
The marketplace of ideas argument has been criticized
on several grounds.139 First, proponents of the market-failure
model argue that there are inequities in the speech market, such
as lack of media access, that create a need for market intervention.140 Second, critics argue that absolute protection of speech
is unjustifiable even though “truth” may eventually prevail because the harm caused in the short term is too great.141
In the context of speaking to a child, the marketplace of
ideas is untenable. First, children “lack the experiential basis of
adults and are more likely to be led astray.”142 They often lack
the capacity to distinguish poorly reasoned ideas from wellreasoned ideas.143 The marketplace theory presupposes that the
“buyers” of ideas will have the capacity to reason. Thus, where
the “buyers” in a market are children, the truth is less likely to
surface, if at all. Our society acknowledges that a child has no
real bargaining power and cannot be counted on to make serious
decisions responsibly. This is exemplified by the fact that children are shielded from other free markets as well (e.g., children
may not work, buy cigarettes or alcohol, or obtain a credit card).
Second, with respect to children, the marketplace of
ideas is not competitive. Parents are the major source of ideas
for young children, especially those who are home-schooled or
isolated. If prejudices begin to form around three or four years
of age, being exposed to different ideas in school after age three
or four will not successfully correct the bias.144 Just as there is
skewed access to media for adults,145 parents occupy a disproportionate market share when it comes to their children.
The second justification for free speech is that it acts as
a check on abuse of governmental authority by enabling people
to speak out against the government and reveal truths about
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those who have political power.146 One view is that this justification survives when applied to parent-to-child speech:
“Government power to coercively restrict parental speech, on
top of its power to engage in its own speech in public schools,
would tend to cement existing orthodoxies and suppress potentially valuable but unpopular ideas.”147 This argument misses
the point that whatever value the expression of potentially valuable but unpopular ideas may have, this value is lost on children
who are unable to comprehend the information. When a child
reaches maturity, a parent’s racist speech will be less harmful to
the child, and thus such “unpopular ideas” will not be absolutely
prohibited.
The third justification for free speech is that a democracy relies on the ability of its members to debate political issues
and make informed choices. Free expression must be the centerpiece of self-government. The self-governance argument148 suggests that “[s]elf-government can exist only insofar as the voters
acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is
assumed to express.”149 When we are speaking of those who do
not participate in the political process, however, this argument is
not persuasive. Because children are not allowed to vote, the
political process is not weakened by restricting adults from expressing political ideas to children. This is especially true for
very young children who do not possess the cognitive ability
even to understand political ideas. Of course, children become
future voters, so there is an interest in preparing them for their
political role by exposing them to diverse beliefs when they are
capable of understanding them. However, these goals are furthered by preserving the autonomy of future generations of voters, not by indoctrinating with racist hate. Where a child has
been taught to hate, she will not be in a position to make informed choices, for her ability to make choices based on reason,
rather than on preprogrammed fear and contempt, will have been
impaired.
A non-instrumental justification for protecting speech
is that it respects individual autonomy and nurtures certain beneficent character traits.150 According to this view, the practice
of tolerating offensive speech rather than punishing it serves the
individual and society by providing a forum for people to exercise their “capacity for tolerance,” which translates generally
into a disposition of restraint and self-denial.151 For example,
“[s]imply coexisting and overcoming the wish to establish an
overly homogenized society are important goals,” and “free
speech may simply function as a zone of extreme tolerance, not
because the behavior tolerated is important to human selfrealization or to truth, but because as a practical matter living
with divergent behavior is necessary.”152 It is inapposite, however, to argue that teaching children to hate based on race creates a general atmosphere of tolerance on the playground. An
adult racist arguably has chosen to be racist. Thus, it makes
sense to suggest that forcing one to hear another’s racist beliefs
may create a more tolerant society. Unlike racist speech among
adults, allowing children to be indoctrinated for the sake of nurturing a tolerant society sacrifices the well-being of the child for
the mere possibility that a tolerant society will emerge. This
sacrifice is too costly.
One argument against the absolute protection of hate
speech that is relevant to parent-to-child hate speech focuses on
the expressive function of the law. In the hate speech context,
the proponents of this view argue that by protecting hate speech,
the law endorses of hate speech. This argument is even more
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persuasive when applied to parent-to-child hate speech. A child,
with a developing identity and a developing sense of self, may
look to the law as guidance on what society approves. By permitting a parent to teach racist hate to a child, the law implies
societal approval and even suggests encouragement of prejudicial ideas.153
CONTOURS OF FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE
The most basic and inaccurate interpretation of the First
Amendment is that it is absolute, that it protects all speech.154
Until 1931, the First Amendment applied only to Congress.155
Thus, free speech protections were once much more limited than
most people have come to expect.156 The key to assessing and
predicting the constitutionality of certain speech regulations lies
in navigating the turbulent waters of free speech rules and exceptions. One of the most important rules in First Amendment
jurisprudence is that speech restrictions must be both content
and viewpoint neutral:
[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content . .
. [T]here is an ‘equality of status in the field of ideas,’
and government must afford all points of view an . . .
opportunity to be heard.157
The regulation of parent-to-child racist speech
violates the content-neutral requirement. One could
argue that the restriction derives from the harm it
causes to children and not its message, but that argument masks the true motivation.158 Even if the regulation is content-based, the captive audience doctrine
may allow the speech to be regulated.
The Supreme Court has identified a hierarchy of protected speech based on the value of the speech.159 The speech
with the highest value is political speech because there is
“practically universal agreement that a major purpose of the
First Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”160 Political speech “includes discussion of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in
which government is operated or should be operated, and all
such matters relating to the political process.”161 Restrictions on
this category receive strict scrutiny, the most stringent protection
under the First Amendment. Speech with lower value, such as
obscenity162 and commercial speech,163 is easier for the government to regulate.
Thus, a relevant question is whether parent-to-child
racist speech is high-value or low-value speech. Some racist
speech carries a political message and therefore should be considered high-value speech, although perhaps not as valuable as
speech directly concerning a political campaign. On the other
hand, some parent-to-child racist speech (e.g., speech regarding
the social characteristics of a race and degrading speech) may
not be political speech and should receive lesser status. However, a viable argument may be made that no speech to a child is
political speech because a child cannot comprehend such political ideas. Even if parent-to-child racist speech is considered to
be of lower value, the Supreme Court has held that contentbased regulations of unprotected speech must still meet strict
scrutiny.164 In sum, parent-to-child racist speech regulations that
restrict political speech based on content place an extremely
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high burden on the government to overcome. That burden may
be overcome by the captive audience doctrine.
FREEDOM FROM BEING CAPTIVE TO RACIST SPEECH165
[A]child—like someone in a captive audience—is not possessed
of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment
guarantees.166
Under the captive audience doctrine, speech is exempted from First Amendment protection if it is delivered to a
captive listener.167 The exception potentially allows the Court to
sidestep the content-neutrality requirement of the First Amendment and to curtail political expression.168
A captive audience, in the First Amendment sense, describes listeners who, under certain circumstances, cannot escape offensive language.169 The degree and type of captivity
necessary to invoke this doctrine is often a central point of contention and confusion.170 Critics first point to the ambiguity of
the word “captive,” arguing that “[w]e are always captive in
some senses, and never captive in others . . . [W]e are virtually
never captive, because there is almost always something we can
do to avoid exposure to whatever we find most offensive.”171
The more central problem in employing this doctrine,
however, is that the Court has been unclear in its application of
the doctrine.172 It is difficult to find guiding language in case
law or a common thread among cases that apply the captive audience doctrine.173 For example, the Court has found people
entering health facilities captive to anti-abortion protests.174 It
has also found a person riding in a car or at home listening to the
radio captive to an offensive radio broadcast;175 a homeowner
captive to focused residential picketing;176 a homeowner captive
to sexually oriented mailings that she has requested not to receive;177 and a public bus rider captive to political campaign
advertising on the bus.178 It is difficult to discern an identifiable
pattern from which a person can determine whether the captive
audience doctrine should apply in a specific case.
Several concepts have been offered to make sense of
First Amendment captivity.179 The first basic concept is that the
captive audience doctrine is founded upon preserving “the right
to be let alone” or “the right to privacy.”180 Two principles underlie this right: an autonomy interest and a right to repose.181
The second concept is that the State has an interest in protecting
the privacy rights of an unwilling listener.
The autonomy principle is common to both the right to
free speech and the right to privacy. Being free to speak one’s
mind nurtures and preserves individual autonomy.182 Likewise,
being able to choose the ideas and thoughts to which one is exposed nurtures and preserves individual autonomy.183 Despite
the various plausible definitions for the word “captivity,” at its
core, captivity suggests that a captive person is one who is deprived of autonomy or meaningful choice. With that definition
in mind, the captive audience doctrine can be understood as a
tool that balances power between the captor and the captive in
order to restore individual autonomy.184
These underlying principles reveal that the goals of the
First Amendment and the right to privacy are not in conflict: by
placing a premium on autonomy, both require protection of the
child from racist indoctrination. Because the young mind is so
easily, and often irreversibly, shaped, parent-to-child racist
speech disturbs the autonomy of the future adult. The State has
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an interest in protecting the autonomy rights of the future adult
disturbed by such speech.
In addition to the right to make individual choices, the
right to be let alone is concerned with the right to repose or to be
at peace. This right is most often violated when a person is being disturbed at home. This is so because if she cannot retreat to
her home, there may be nowhere to retreat at all. Consequently,
the home has a special status in captive audience jurisprudence.185 The right to repose in one’s home has a strong implication for parent-to-child racist indoctrination because such
communication likely occurs in the home. Thus, the child has
nowhere to retreat from unwanted racist inculcation. In sum,
both the child’s autonomy interest and the child’s right to repose
the two interests the captive audience doctrine endeavors to protect will be served if the captive audience doctrine is applied to
the parent-to-child hate speech paradigm.
The State also has an interest in protecting the unwilling listener. In the parent-to-child hate speech paradigm, the
child may seem to be a willing listener. Being willing, however,
presupposes that the listener has a choice. In the parent-to-child
model, the child has no choice and is therefore presumptively
unwilling. A young child is truly captive to her parents.186 She
cannot decide to be born, to be born into a particular family, or
to be provided with a particular level of care.187 In addition,
“[w]hatever chance [she] may have at achieving autonomy depends on the emotional and material resources invested during
[her] childhood.”188 Because a child is dependent upon her
guardian189 for everyday necessities, a child has no choice but to
listen.190 In that sense, a child is powerless to turn off harmful
speech.

CONCLUSION: WAIT UNTIL THEY’RE OLDER
Free speech and a parent’s right to control the upbringing of her child are two of the most important rights granted by
the United States Constitution. Both rights protect and reflect
autonomy and privacy. They secure a profound sense of liberty,
under which this country has flourished. At the same time, both
rights have limitations founded on a basic principle of collective
well-being. Those limitations are at its strongest when the wellbeing of a child is at stake. While a child is not a mere creature
of the State, neither is a child a mere creature of her parents.
The reality is that some parents do not act with the best interests
of their child in mind. As social science research suggests, a
parent who raises her child as a racist does not act in the best
interests of her child. Therefore, a parent’s right to control the
upbringing of her child may be limited by the State’s power to
protect the child’s well-being.
The State’s power to restrict a parent from indoctrinating her child is governed by both the free speech doctrine and
the substantive due process doctrine. Under the best-interestsof-the-child standard, the State may interfere with a parent’s
right to control the upbringing of the child, though the State action must meet strict scrutiny to prevail on constitutional
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grounds. The precise scope of the State’s power under this standard is unclear and is largely within the court’s discretion. Wide
discretion in this area may be problematic because it leaves it up
to a judge, with little guidance, to decide what is best for the
child.
Under the captive audience doctrine, a state may have
the power to limit a parent’s racist speech to her child because
the child is captive to her parent’s speech. The main theoretical
obstacle to regulating parent-to-child hate speech is that it interferes with one of the central tenets of free speech: the content
and viewpoint-neutrality requirement. It is not up to the government to prescribe orthodoxy. Proscribing parent-to-child hate
speech can be considered a viewpoint-neutral restriction—that
is, no one can teach their children to hate. Even if the neutrality
requirement is not met, the captive audience doctrine may allow
the State to bypass the requirement when the child is deemed
captive to her parent’s hate speech.
There are also several practical obstacles that must be
addressed if the State is to regulate parent-to-child hate speech.
First, the State may not be in a position to know what a child is
learning in the home. A possible answer to this obstacle would
be to treat parental racist indoctrination as akin to child abuse.
Like child abuse, there are physical and verbal manifestations of
racism. A second related obstacle is finding a plaintiff to assert
the child’s rights in court. A possible solution is that, as in child
abuse cases, the State could assert the child’s rights. A next
friend or a guardian ad litem can be assigned.
Even if a way to enforce a regulation or rule is found,
there is the potential that the restrictions will disproportionately
affect divorced parents, single parents, or African-American
parents because of their overrepresentation in the legal system.
Affording a judge broad discretion may also lead to inconsistent
application.
Another obstacle to regulating parent-to-child hate
speech is the ability to find an appropriate remedy. Absent other
evidence of abuse, separating a child from her parent may be too
extreme, especially when such separation is based on inconclusive science and inconsistent application of the law. A practical
response would instead be a judicial order not to use specific
language in front of the child or mandatory enrollment in a tolerance workshop for the parent and child.
This article is just a small step toward the goal of protecting children from their parents’ racist indoctrination. It sets
forth a possible goal, though one with many well-intentioned
legal obstacles in the way.
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